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THE LANDOWNER VERSUS THE AIRPORT*
I. MARTIN LEAVITr**
T HIS subject is one of the most interesting in the field of aeronautical
law, and of rapidly increasing importance. All will agree that the
airplane is far beyond the experimental stage and, as was said by
Chief Judge Cardozo, in Hesse v. Rath,
"Aviation is today an established method of transportation.
The future, even the near future, will make it still more general.
The city that is without the foresight to build the ports for the new
traffic may soon be left behind in the race of competition. Chalce-
don was called the city of the blind, because its founders rejected
the noble site of Byzantium lying at their feet. The need for vision
of the future in the governance of cities has not lessened with the
years. The dweller within the gates, even more than the stranger
from afar, will pay the price of blindness."'
The growth of aviation during the past few years has been remark-
able but, since the termination of the recent war, its expansion has far
exceeded all expectations. During the first seven months of 1946, the
domestic airlines of the United States carried 6,419,238 revenue passen-
gers for a distance of 3,177,006,595 revenue passenger miles. This was
an increase of 90.26 and 80.17 per cent respectively over the compar-
able period in 1945. This is amazing, but it has been predicted that by
the end of 1946 the revenue passenger miles flown will reach six billion.
To this add an estimated one billion cargo ton miles to be flown by the
cargo carriers, most of whom have recently entered the field, and we
begin to realize the tremendous proportions which commercial aviation
has assumed. These figures do not include private planes owned and
operated by individuals, or those used at flying schools or activities of
that nature.
Larger and faster planes are leaving the hangars of the manu-
facturers, and are being delivered to the commercial companies as
rapidly as possible. The coming year will see many more planes in the
sky than we ever dreamed would be there. Some experts are predicting
an increase in the number of aircraft within the next ten years from
thirty thousand to four hundred thousand.2 And, based on the number
of airplanes presently on order, and the estimated delivery dates of
* Address delivered at the sixtieth annual meeting of the West Virginia Bar
Association at Clarksburg, West Virginia, October 24, 1946.
** Member of the District of Columbia bar.
1249 N. Y. 436, 164 N. E. 362 (1928).
2 Civil Aeronautics Administration, CIVIL AVIATION AND THE NATIONAL
ECONOMY (1945).
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these planes, it is entirely possible that by the end of 1947 the total
seating capacity of all the airplanes in operation in the United States
will exceed the total seating capacity of all the railroads. This state-
ment, as well as the others is astounding, but it must be realized that
many of the airplanes scheduled for delivery in 1947 will have more
passenger seats than the present railroad day coach.
As the planes get larger and the numbers increase, it logically and
necessarily follows that our existing airport facilities must be extended
and additional airports constructed. In 1926 there were approximately
four hundred airfields in the United States listed "as reliable despite
rotation of crops." About three of these had paved runways, none of
which exceeded three thousand feet in length. Today this number of
four hundred has been increased to more than four thousand-many
with paved runways, lighting equipment for night operations, and
with control towers to direct traffic. These four thousand airfields are,
however, as inadequate in number as the four hundred were in 1926.
Aviation has advanced so rapidly that there is still the same need for
more and more airports in convenient locations as there was twenty
years ago.
The seventy-ninth Congress recognized the need for additional
airport facilities and passed a law known as the Federal Airport Act."
Without going into detail as to how the funds may be obtained, it will
suffice to say that, under this act, the Civil Aeronautics Administrator
is the custodian of a five-hundred-million-dollar fund to be apportioned
among the several states and the territories of Alaska, Hawaii, and
Puerto Rico, for the development of a national airport system. With
these federal. funds available, an airport program will soon get underway
throughout the entire nation, and many communities presently without
facilities will build airports commensurate with their needs. It has been
said that this act will do for aviation what the federal highway program
did for the automobile industry after World War I.
As construction is completed and the facilities placed in operation
many additional legal controversies will arise between the landowners
on the one hand and the airport owners, or the people who own and fly
the planes, on the other.
To a member of the public an airport is clearly in the public interest
and, bringing to the surrounding area a modem and accepted mode of
transportation, is the symbol of a progressive community. To a land-
owner in the vicinity of an airport, however, it may, from his point of
view, be a nuisance and definitely interfere with the quiet and peaceful
8 60 STAT. 170 (1946), 49 U. S. C. A. §§1101-1119 (Supp. 1946).
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enjoyment of his property. He may complain of the noise and planes,
either while on the ground or in the air; of the dust created by the terrific
backwash of the propellers being turned by powerful engines; of the
glare of high-powered airport lights or the landing lights on the planes;
of the crowds which are normally attracted to an airport or from the fear
and apprehension for his or his family's safety caused by low-flying
planes, or a combination of several of these.
As larger airplanes with more powerful engines are placed in opera-
tion, the complaints of landowners will more often be concerned with
noise and low-flying. The question of noise and low-flying is today one
of the major topics of conversation among the residents of Alexandria,
Virginia, located near the Washington National Airport, one of the
largest and busiest airports in the world. And in Chicago, a petition
bearing seven hundred signatures has been presented to the air carrier
inspector of the Civil Aeronautics Administration threatening court
action against the airlines serving the Chicago area unless the noise
nuisance caused by incoming and outgoing planes is abated; the peti-
tioners allege that the nervous strain from these operations has become
unbearable. In Akron, Ohio, a hotly contested court action is being
waged between the residents of a fashionable West Akron neighborhood,
and the owner of a partially completed private airport; the residents are
seeking to enjoin the completion of the airport because they claim that its
operation will create a hazard to their homes and property, and the
noise of the airplanes and the noise and dust raised in landings and take-
offs will be a nuisance; the airport owner, on the other hand, denies these
allegations and asserts that the location of the field is ideal for providing
the area with a much needed private flying field and hangar space; at
the present time, this trial has been recessed for several weeks in order
that additional evidence may be collected.
As those who travel by air well know, the maximum noise from an
airplane occurs when the plane is taking off because the engines are of
necessity operating at full throttle. The same is true of low-flying. To
land and take off the planes must travel at low altitudes while approach-
ing or leaving the field. These two complaints are those most often heard,
and are the ones for which more suits are being brought than for any
other causes attributable to airport operations.
But all of the complaints which are voiced are not directed against
the airport or the operator of the plane. Like every other controversy
there is another side to it. The owner of the airport may object to the
landowner using his property so as to interfere with the normal and safe
operation of the airport. The landowner may cause great quantities of
3
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smoke to pour from his chimneys creating a condition which may result
in the cancellation of all flights into and out of the field because of poor
visibility, or he may erect tall buildings, towers or poles which will create
an equal safety hazard. In some cases these hazards, if permitted to con-
tinue, may make the entire airport absolutely worthless as far as its
original and contemplated operation is concerned. Thus it readily can
be seen that the owner of an airport must be accorded relief in certain
instances if his airport is to survive.
The Civil Aeronautics Administration, whose duty it is to prescribe
regulations to promote the safety of flights, has, among other things,
established the minimum distance which obstructions must be from air-
ports in order that planes may land or take off with safety. This regula-
tion, known as the airport approach standards, provides that all airports,
except those of a size suitable to accommodate only small personal planes,
must have aerial approaches free from obstructions at least two miles
from the ends of the runways in order that planes can descend or climb at
the ratio of thirty feet horizontally to one foot vertically. If the weather
is bad and the plane is required to use instruments to approach and land,
then this ratio is increased to forty to one. Thus no obstruction within
two miles of the airport in line with its runways can be higher, depending
upon the type of operation proposed, than one thirtieth or one fortieth
its distance from the end of the runways. In order for a pilot to meet the
safety requirements in landing or taking off, an object fifty feet high, on
the same elevation as the airport, located five hundred feet from the end
of the runway reduces the usable length of the runway by one thousand
feet, and under instrument conditions by fifteen hundred feet.
You can readily see that there are many real possibilities of conflict
between the landowner and the airport pilot. These conflicts have raised,
and will continue to raise, many interesting problems such as the preser-
vation of private property rights of individuals as well as the preservation
of airports, most of which are owned and operated by states or some sub-
division thereof, and built with public funds.
For convenience of consideration these problems may well be stated
in two questions. (1) Does the landowner to whom the operations of an
airport or the low-flying of airplanes is objectionable, have cause of
action for damages or injunctive relief against the owner of the airport
or the pilot of the airplane, and (2) does the owner of the airport have
recourse against a landowner who uses his property in such a manner as
to create a hazard to the landing or taking off of airplanes, or in any
other manner interferes with the proper use of the airport?
4
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Turning to a consideration of the first of these questions, namely,
whether or not an airport is a nuisance, it is well settled by the authorities
that an airport, flying school, or landing field is not a nuisance per se,
but it may very well become such if it is constructed in an unsuitable
location or if its operation interferes unreasonably with the comfort of
adjoining landowners.4 The question which then becomes apparent is
when, or under what circumstances, will injunctive relief be granted to
abate as nuisances certain airport operations? As the airplane and airport
play such an important role in our every-day life and are becoming more
important as aviation progresses, it may be said that the determination of
whether or not a particular operation should be enjoined involves a bal-
ancing of interests between the landowner and the airport. In resolving
such interests, the courts must consider the extent of the injury com-
plained of by the landowner and balance that against the value of the
airport to the public in the light of the universal acceptance of aviation.
In addition to this, the courts must further inquire as to the effect
the granting of the relief prayed for will have on the present and future
operations of the airport. If the balance of interests is in favor of the
landowner, then the operation complained of will be declared a nuisance
and relief granted; but if the balance is in favor of the airport, then the
injuries complained of are justified and no nuisance has been created.
Examples of the circumstances under which the landowner would
be entitled to relief are where the airport is privately owned and
privately operated, but its normal and proper operations extensively in-
terfere with the nearby landowner's quiet and peaceful enjoyment of his
property; or where the injury to the landowner could easily be avoided or
lessened. In both cases damages and injunctive relief should be granted.
A distinction, however, must be made in regard to the extent of the ap-
plicability of the injunction. In the first example, if the operations com-
plained of could not be corrected in any manner so as to eliminate the
alleged injury, then the entire airport should be abated. In the second
example, only those operations specifically complained of should be
enjoined.
There are situations, however, where the balance of interests is in
favor of the airport and relief to the landowner will be denied. An
example of this is where the airport is suitably located, properly operated
4 Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F. (2d) 201 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932);
Batcheller v. Commonwealth, 176 Va. 104, 10 S. E. (2d) 529 (1940); Delta
Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S. E. (2d) 245 (1942); Thrasher v.
Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S. E. 817 (1934); Vanderslice v. Shawn, 27 A. (2d)
87 (Del. Ch. 1942); Warren Township School Dist. No. 7 v. Detroit, 308
Mich. 460, 14 N. W. (2d) 134 (1944).
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and is owned by the public, or, if privately owned, serves a great public
need, but the landowner alleges that the low-flying, noise, dust or other
complaints incident to airport operations are nuisances and seeks dam-
ages and an injunction. If the airport were being operated properly and
none of the injuries complained of could be corrected without interfer-
ing with the safety and efficiency of the airport, then relief would be
denied to the landowner and his right to the quiet and peaceful enjoy-
ment of his property would be subordinated to the public interest and
welfare.
Smith v. New England Aircraft Company5 was almost the first, if
not the very first, case in which landowners sought to enjoin the opera-
tion of airplanes over their property alleging that the noise created con-
stituted a nuisance. In denying the injunctive relief sought, on the basis
that the flights complained of were over densely wooded areas and the
noise, proximity and number of aircraft had not been such as to be
harmful to the health or comfort of ordinary people, the court said, "The
law affords no rigid rule to be used as a test in all instances of alleged
nuisance. It is elastic. It requires only that which is fair and reasonable in
all the circumstances."8
However, in several cases injunctive relief has been granted in
connection with the use of an airport or the operations in and out of it.'
And, in at least two cases, the entire operations of the airport have been
abated.8 In another case, the court held that low-flying was a nuisance
to adjoining landowners which entitled them to damages if not injunc-
tive relief. And in a very recent case the court warned a city that the
proposed operation of a contemplated airport might be a nuisance be-
cause of its proximity to three schools, a church and an U. S. 0. build-
ing.1
0
In deciding these cases, the courts have indicated that the public
interest in the operation of airports has strongly influenced their deci-
sions, although in each instance they have based their findings on other
grounds. In each case it has been held that only the unusual, unneces-
5270 Mass. 511, 170 N. E. 385 (1930).
6 Ibid.
7Bumham v. Beverly Airways, Inc., 311 Mass. 628, 42 N. E. (2d) 575
(1942) ; Thrasher v. Atlanta, Vanderslice v. Shawn, both supra n. 4.
8 Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F. (2d) 201 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932)
(construction and operation of privately owned airport enjoined at request of
nearby residential property owners) ; Gay & Rush Hospital v. Taylor, 1934 U. S.
Av. Rep. 146 (Pa. Common Pleas Ct. 1932) (operations of privately owned
airport enjoined at request of country estate owners and hospital.
9 Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S. E. (2d) 245 (1942).
10 Warren Township School District No. 7 v. Detroit, 308 Mich. 460, 14
N. W. (2d) 134 (1944).
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sary and unreasonable operation may be classed as a nuisance for which
relief may be had and, in most instances, the courts have found that the
operations complained of were such as could be classed as incidental to
the ordinary and necessary functions of an airport and thus not nuis-
ances. But if the operation complained of can be corrected the court
will enjoin that operation and award the proper damages, but it will
not abate the entire project. This is evident in the 1942 Georgia case of
Delta Air Corporation v. KerseyI wherein the petitioner complained
that the city of Atlanta had constructed and maintained its airport in
such a manner "as to require such low-flying over the home of peti-
tioner as to constitute an unreasonable interference with the health of
petitioner and his family." In finding that the lower court had incor-
rectly sustained the city's demurrer and in remanding the case for trial,
the supreme court said, "From all that appears the conditions causing
the low-flying may be remedied, but if on the trial it should appear that
it is indispensable to the public interest that the airport should continue
to be operated in its present condition, it may be that the petitioner
should be denied injunctive relief."'
2
No problem is presented where the airplane actually comes in
contact with the land or any structures thereon. This is clearly a trespass
and the operator is held accountable for all damages which may result.
A problem is presented, however, Wvhere the airplane does not come into
physical contact with any of the landowner's possessions, but merely
travels through the airspace above his property. The question with
which we are then confronted is whether old time-honored common law
concepts of ownership and trespass shall govern or whether the new
conditions of life incident to the development of air transportation will
give rise to new legal principles applicable to this situation.
Three hundred years ago when the law of real property was in the
process of development in England, and every effort was being made
to protect the landowner's quiet and peaceful enjoyment of his prop-
erty, Lord Coke wrote that "he who owns the land owns up to the
sky." At that time the question of ownership of airspace, as we think of
it today, was purely academic, because Baten's Case,"3 in which this
now famous maxim was first used judicially, held only that projecting
eaves from which rain water fell upon the plaintiff's land constituted
a nuisance. Although this maxim was pure dictum in Baten's Case,
nevertheless it was subsequently followed by the courts and became
11 193 Ga. 862, 20 S. E. (2d) 245 (1942).
12 Id. at 872, 20 S. E. (2d) at 251.
Is 9 Co. 516 (1611).
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firmly entrenched in our law. It was a good rule of thumb, so to speak,
and it did have logic in its favor because the only situations then con-
fronting the courts dealing with the invasion of the air space above the
land without contact with its surface were those concerning projecting
eaves of a building, leaning walls, thrusting of an arm across a
boundary line, and like situations, all of which occurred near the earth
and actually interfered with the quiet and- peaceful enjoyment of the
surface thereof. Since the advent of the airplane, however, the imprac-
ticability of the application of Lord Coke's words of wisdom has become
apparent.
An examination of the authorities wherein the "ad coelum"
maxim has been applied, reveals that this rule has not been given a
literal application by the courts with respect to airspace ownership in
the field of air navigation. In his concurring opinion in Northwest Air-
lines v. Minnesota,14 Mr. Justice Jackson stated:
"The ancient idea that landlordism and sovereignty extend
from the center of the world to the periphery of the universe has
been modified. Today the landowner no more possesses a vertical
control of all the air above him than a shore owner possesses hori-
zontal control of all the sea before him. The air is too precious as
an open highway to permit it to be 'owned' to the exclusion or em-
barrassment of air navigation by surface landlords who could put
it to little real use." 15
In Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport8 the court analyzed the rights
in airspace as follows:
"The air, like the sea, is by nature incapable of private owner-
ship, except in so far as one may actually use it. This principle was
announced long ago by Justinian. It is in fact the basis upon which
practically all of our so-called water codes are based.
"We own so much of the space above the ground as we can
occupy or make use of, in connection with the enjoyment of our
land. This right is not fixed. It varies with our varying needs and is
co-extensive with them. The owner of land owns as much of the
space above him as he uses, but only so long as he uses it. All that
lies beyond belongs to the world.
"When it is said that man owns, or may own, to the heavens,
that merely means that no one can acquire a right to the space
above him that will limit him in whatever use he can make of it as
a part of his enjoyment of the land. To this extent his title to the air
is paramount. No other person can acquire any title or exclusive
right to any space above him.
14 322 U. S. 292, 64 S. Ct. 950, 88 L. ed. 1283 (1944).
15 Id. at 302.
1684 F. (2d) 755 (0. C. A. 9th, 1936), cert. denied 300 U. S. 654, 57 S. Ct.
431, 81 L. ed. 865 (1937).
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"Any use of such air or space by others which is injurious to
his land, or which constitutes aii actual interference with his pos-
session or his beneficial use thereof, would be a trespass for which
he would have remedy. But any claim of the landowner beyond this
cannot find a precedent in law, nor support in reason."' 17
When it first became apparent that airplanes were being accused by
landowners of committing trespasses, a definite rule had to be established
to supersede the ownership to the sky theory. The courts discarded Lord
Coke's maxim once and for all by holding that the air was free above
certain altitudes as fixed by federal and state statutes; and, in the ab-
sence of such statutes, that the landowner owns so much of the airspace
above his property as he could effectively use in the enjoyment of such
property, and any flights of aircraft within such limits might be con-
sidered a nuisance to the use to which the property was then being put,
or, in some jurisdictions, a technical trespass.
Thus a major issue is presented. Should a landowner have any
remedy against low-flying aircraft if such flights cause him no harm?
The jurisdictions which have had this particular problem to determine
are divided into two schools of thought which may be classed as the
technical trespass and nuisance schools. These opposing theories are
ably discussed by the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts in Smith
v. New England Aircraft Company, 8 as modified by Burnham v. Beverly
Airways, Inc.,'9 and by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit in Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corporation.20 The technical tres-
pass advocates set the limit of ownership of airspace at the height to
which the landowner may effectively and reasonably use it whereas the
nuisance proponents set this limit at the height below which airplanes
would annoy or injure the landowner in the quiet and peaceful enjoy-
ment of his property. In the technical trespass jurisdictions, a trespass
action for nominal damages would be sustained even though there was
no actual interference with property rights and if such flights continue
they could be enjoined. In the nuisance jurisdictions, however, actual
damages must be proven before any relief will be granted.
The Supreme Court, in the case of United States v. Causby,2' had
the question of ownership of airspace squarely presented to it. The facts
of this case are extremely interesting, and should be noted in some detail
because no doubt quite similar facts will be presented in future cases in-
17 Id. at 758.
18 270 Mass. 511, 170 N. E. 385 (1930).
19 311 Mass. 628, 42 N. E. (2d) 575 (1942), cited supra n. 7.
20 55 F. (2d) 201 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932) cited supra n. 4.
2166 S. Ct. 1062, 90 L. ed. 971 (U. S. 1946).
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volving low flying. Although this case concerns an action against the
federal government, nevertheless the principles involved may as well be
applicable to civil airplanes.
The Causbys owned two and eight-tenths acres near an airport out-
side of Greensboro, North Carolina. On this property were a dwelling
.house, a barn, and various out-buildings used mainly for raising chickens.
The end of the airport's northwest-southeast runway was 2,220 feet from
the barn and 2,275 feet from the house. In landing and taking off, the
planes passed over the Causby property at 83 'feet, which was 67 feet
above the house, 63 feet above the barn and 18 fdet above the highest
tree. In May, 1942, the United States leased this airport for use by var-
ious types of military aircraft. These planes, including four-engined
heavy bombers, other planes of the heavier type, and fighter planes fre-
quently passed over the Causby property in considerable number and
rather close together. They came close enough at times to appear barely
to miss the tops of the trees and at times so close to the tops of the trees as
to blow the old leaves off. The noise was startling, and at night the glare
from the planes' lights brightly illuminated the place. As a result of the
noise and lights, the Causbys were forced to abandon their poultry
business. Many of the chickens were killed by flying into the walls from
fright and the productivity of those remaining fell off. In addition, the
Causbys were frequently deprived of their sleep and the entire family
became nervous and frightened.
This action was brought in the Court of Claims to recover seven
thousand dollars for the alleged taking of the land and for damages to
the poultry business. The Court of Claims held that the United States
had taken an easement over the property under the Fifth Amendment of
the Constitution and fixed the value of the property destroyed and the
easement taken at two thousand dollars.22 In approving the Court of
Claims' finding that there was a taking under the Fifth Amendment, but
remanding the case in order that it might be determined whether the
taking was permanent or temporary, the Supreme Court, in an opmion
by Mr. Justice Douglas stated:
"It is ancient doctrine that at common law ownership of the
land extended to the periphery of the universe-Cujus est solum
ejus est usque ad coelum. But that doctrine has no place in the
modem world. The air is a public highway, as Congress has de-
clared. Were that not true, every transcontinental flight would
subject the operator to countless trespass suits. Common sense re-
volts at the idea. To recognize such private claims to the airspace
would clog these highways, seriously interfere with their control
22 104 Ct. C1. 342, 60 F. Supp. 751 (1945).
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and development in the public interest, and transfer into private
ownership that to which only the public has a just claim."
2
How, then, could the Supreme Court hold that the instant case was
a taking of property by the United States? To answer, we must go back
to the Air Commerce Act of 1926,24 as amended by the Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938.25 Under these statutes the United States has "complete and
exclusive national sovereignty in the airspace" over this country. They
grant any citizen of the United States "a public right of freedom of tran-
sit in air commerce through the navigable airspace of the United States."
"Air Commerce" is defined as including "any operation or navigation of
aircraft which directly affects, or which may endanger safety in, inter-
state, overseas, or foreign air commerce," and "navigable airspace" is de-
fined as "airspace above the minimum safe altitudes of flight prescribed
by the Civil Aeronautics Authority." The minimum safe altitudes which
have been prescribed are five hundred feet during the day and one thou-
sand feet at night for air carriers and from three hundred feet to one
thousand feet for other aircraft, depending on the type of plane and the
character of the terrain. It will be noted that no provision is made for
planes landing or taking off. The absolute minimum which has been set
is three hundred feet, and the airplanes complained of in the instant
case were flying at eighty-three.
The further question arises, suppose the Civil Aeronautics Adminis-
tration should make a regulation providing for safe altitudes for landing
or taking off? It will be recalled that the airport approach standards
were previously mentioned wherein planes landing or taking off must
descend or climb at the ratio of thirty feet horizontally to one foot ver-
tically, with this ratio being increased to forty to one if instruments are
used. But this is not included in the prescribed safe altitudes. If the ad-
ministration did fix such takeoff or landing altitudes then the validity of
such regulation, depending upon the altitudes fixed, would be for the
courts, and if they were held proper, then any airspace needed for land-
ings or takeoffs could be appropriated, and flights which were so close to
the land as to render it uninhabitable would be immune.
What the Civil Aeronautics Administration will do remains to be
seen, but it is readily apparent that the holding in the Causby case will
require some action by it to provide for landings and takeoffs which are
essential to flying. Mr. Justice Douglas did state, however, that "flights
over private land are not a taking unless they are so low and so frequent
2266 S. Ct. at 1065 (1946).
2444 STAT. 568 (1927), 49 U. S. C. §171 (1934).
2852 STAT. 973 (1938), 49 U. S. C. §401 (Supp. 1939).
11
Leavitt: The Landowner Versus the Airport
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1947
156 LANDOWNER VERSUS THE AIRPORT
as to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and
use of the land." 2 This holding is merely a reiteration of the nuisance
theory, requiring actual damages before any recovery can be had.
We come now to the second major problem, namely, whether
or not the owner of the airport has any recourse against the landowner.
In constructing a new airport or extending present ones, the poten-
tial hazards may be eliminated by the purchase or acquisition of suffi-
cient surrounding property. This would be the only manner in which
existing obstructions could be legally removed. It would not be econom-
ically feasible however, to purchase enough prQperty to prevent the
future erection of structures which may be considered as hazards to the
safe operation of the airport. In fact, this is not necessary.
As has always been held by the courts, a landowner may use his
property in such manner as would be necessary to its enjoyment. How-
ever, the courts will enjoin the erection and maintenance of obstruc-
tions to normal airport operations if such obstructions were erected
for spite or with the intent to interfere with the necessary low-flying
in and out of the airport. In cases of this nature, the courts have said
that the erection of obstructions with the intent to make the operations
of the airport dangerous does not constitute a proper use and enjoyment
of the landowner's property and would not be necessary for its en-
joyment.
If the obstructions are erected in good faith and without any
ulterior motive, then the courts have refused to grant relief to the air-
port. And it may be possible that such obstructions may cause the oper-
ations of the airport to be so hazardous that such operations must be
suspended.
27
To prevent this very situation from arising the state police power,
under certain conditions and with certain limitations, may be invoked.
This may be accomplished by citf or county zoning regulations or by
statewide zoning regulations having as their only purpose the prohibi-
tion of airport hazards. These zoning regulations have been advocated
by the Civil Aeronautics Administration, but like any other exercise
of the state police power, these regulations must be reasonable in their
application to private property rights. If they are not reasonable they
will undoubtedly be held invalid by the courts. Time will not permit an
analysis of the legal principles governing the reasonableness of police
regulations, but the problem seems to be again the balance of interests
between aviation and the rights of the private property owner.
26 66 S. Ct. at 1068.
27 Cf. FIXEL, LAw oF AVIATION (2d ed. 1945) 100, 101.
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Thus it presently appears that a reasonable zoning law is probably
the most effective means of protecting the approaches to airports.
In conclusion, the answers to the problems which have been dis-
cussed must be left to the legislatures, both federail and state, and to
the courts. From the decisions of the courts, however, it appears that
they are not as concerned with the protection of the rights of the land-
owner or the owner of the airport as they are with the great public in-
terest attendant upon the advent of the airplane and its development
into a new mode of transportation.
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